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We introduce and discuss a nonlinear kinetic equation of Boltzmann type which describes the evolution of
wealth in a pure gambling process, where the entire sum of wealths of two agents is up for gambling, and ran-
domly shared between the agents. For this equation the analytical form of the steady states is found for various
realizations of the random fraction of the sum which is shared to the agents. Among others, Gibbs distribution
appears as steady state in case of a uniformly distributed random fraction, while Gamma distribution appears
for a random fraction which is Beta distributed. The case in which the gambling game is only conservative-in-
the-mean is shown to lead to an explicit heavy tailed distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various concepts and techniques of statistical mechanics
have been fruitfully applied for years to a wide variety of com-
plex extended systems, physical and otherwise, in an effort to
understand the emergent properties appearing in them. Eco-
nomics is, by far, one of the complex extended systems to
which methods borrowed from statistical mechanics for parti-
cle systems have been applied [7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 23, 24, 29]. In
most of the models introduced so far, the trading mechanism
leaves the total mean wealth unchanged. Then, a substantial
difference on the final behavior of the model (presence or not
of tailed steady states) can be observed depending on the fact
that binary trades are pointwise conservative, or conservative
in the mean [15, 26]. The asymptotic distribution of wealth,
however, depends completely on the microscopic structure of
binary trades. Other kinetic models have been recently pro-
posed, which, while maintaining the kinetic description, in-
troduce more sophisticated rules for trading. For example, a
description of the behavior of a stock price has been developed
by Cordier, Pareschi and Piatecki in [12]. Further, there have
been efforts to include non-microscopic effects, like global
taxation (and subsequent redistribution), in recent works of
Guala [22], Pianegonda, Iglesias, Abramson and Vega [28],
Garibaldi, Scalas and Viarengo [19] and Bisi, Spiga and the
present author [2, 31].
Despite the high number of studies devoted to the sub-
ject, well documented by various recent review papers [9, 21,
27, 32, 33], analytical solutions or explicit steady states for
wealth distribution densities are rarely present in the litera-
ture. The few exceptions are the self-similar solution with
Pareto tails found by Slanina [29] for a kinetic model of a
non-conservative (decreasing in the mean) economy, and the
steady state solution (Gibbs distribution) of a linear kinetic
equation modelling taxation and uniform redistribution [31].
The goal of this paper is to show that in a pure gambling
trade market explicit equilibrium solutions can be obtained by
suitably choosing the random fraction of money which gov-
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erns the microscopic interaction.
Wealth exchange processes in a discrete market are char-
acterized by binary trades. A fixed number of N agents in a
system are allowed to interact (trade) stochastically and thus
wealth is exchanged between them. The basic steps of such a
wealth exchange model can be described as follows
wi(t + 1) = wi(t)+∆w, w j(t + 1) = w j(t)−∆w, (1.1)
where wi(t) and w j(t) are wealths of i-th and j-th agents at
time t and wi(t + 1) and w j(t + 1) are that at the next time
step t + 1. The amount ∆w (to be won or to be lost by an
agent) is determined by the nature of interaction. If the agents
are allowed to interact for a long enough time, a steady state
equilibrium distribution for individual wealth is achieved. The
equilibrium distribution does not depend on the initial config-
uration (initial distribution of wealth among the agents).
In a pure gambling process [14], the entire sum of wealths
of two agents is up for gambling. Some random fraction of
this sum is shared by one agent and the rest goes to the other.
The randomness is introduced into the model through a pa-
rameter ε which is a random number drawn from a probability
distribution in [0,1]. In general it is assumed that ε is indepen-
dent of a pair of agents, so that a pair of agents is not likely
to share the same fraction of aggregate wealth the same way
when they interact repeatedly. The interaction rule can be seen
through
wi(t + 1) = ε[wi(t)+w j(t)],
w j(t + 1) = (1− ε)[wi(t)+w j(t)], (1.2)
where the pair of agents (indicated by i and j) are chosen
randomly. The amount of wealth that is exchanged is now
∆w = ε[wi(t) +w j(t)]−wi(t). Numerical experiments [21]
show that, if ε is a random number drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution in [0,1], the individual wealth distribution at equi-
librium emerges out to be Gibbs distribution like exponential.
It is strongly believed, and somewhat argued from numerical
experiments, that a slight variant of the previous model pro-
duces at equilibrium Gamma-like distributions [10], but, as
remarked by the authors, the form of the exact solution is still
an open question. The main feature of trade (1.2) is such the
amount of money which is restituted in a single trade coin-
cides with the amount of money the two agents use for gam-
bling (pointwise conservative trade). In this gambling market
2there is no rule of the (conserved) total amount of money ini-
tially in the hands of the agents. In other words, agents do
not take advantage from the amount of money available in the
market.
The idea of using this money as a reservoir for trades can
be easily implemented allowing agents to trade with random
profit
wi(t + 1) = ε1[wi(t)+w j(t)],
w j(t + 1) = ε2[wi(t)+w j(t)],
(1.3)
where the parameters (ε1,ε2) are now random numbers drawn
from a joint probability distribution such that
〈ε1 + ε2〉= 1, (1.4)
where 〈·〉 denotes as usual the mathematical expectation.
Within this picture, wi(t + 1)+w j(t + 1) can be strictly less
than wi(t)+w j(t), and in this case the lost money is achieved
by the market, or the reverse situation is verified, and the addi-
tional money is taken from the market. Condition (1.4), how-
ever, guarantees that in the mean the wealth present in the mar-
ket is left unchanged. Note that if one assumes that εi ≥ γ > 0,
i = 1,2 then agents are prevented from loosing all their money
in a single trade. Note also that, choosing (ε1,ε2) = (ε,1− ε)
the collision rule (1.3) becomes (1.2).
In order to produce a fair game, it will be assumed that
the random numbers ε1 and ε2 are identically distributed. For
trades of type (1.2), this assumption simply forces the random
fraction ε to be symmetric with respect to the value 1/2.
At a continuous level, the evolution of the wealth distribu-
tion can be described by means of a nonlinear kinetic model of
Boltzmann type, in which the wealth distribution of the mar-
ket is driven by collisions of type (1.2) [6]. Since the total
mean wealth is maintained constant in time, the wealth distri-
bution is known to converge exponentially towards a steady
profile [15, 26], which depends on the details of the trade
mechanism through εi. It is well-known that the continuous
description takes advantage from the the possibility to make
use of the Laplace transform version of the kinetic equation
[3].
Owing to this representation, we will prove that various
cases are explicitly solvable, and lead to an analytic expres-
sion of the steady profile. In particular, choosing εi to be sym-
metric Beta distributions one obtains as equilibrium a Gamma
distribution with a parameter which depends on the parameter
of the Beta distribution. A special case emerges here, since
Gibbs distribution emerges for εi uniformly distributed. Also,
the case of the winner takes all game can be studied in details
as limit of Beta ε , with parameter tending to zero. In all these
cases, however, the equilibria possess moments of any order.
Interestingly enough, the case of the conservative in the
mean gambling trade (1.3) can be treated likewise, by choos-
ing the random variables εi, i = 1,2 to be inverse Beta. In this
case, however, the steady state distribution is shown to be a
generalized Gamma distribution with fat tails, which contains
as a particular case the distribution found by Slanina [29] in
a different context. This founding clarifies through a simple
example the role of the social use of the money present in the
market. The possibility to access to the money available in the
common reservoir allows the formation of the rich class.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
introduce the continuous model which is described by a non-
linear kinetic equation of Boltzmann type, and its main fea-
tures are discussed in some detail. The analytical solutions
in the case of the pure gambling trade (1.2) are described in
Section 3. Section 4 deals with the gambling rule (1.3).
II. A CONTINUOUS KINETIC MODEL
Given a fixed number of N agents in a system, which are
allowed to trade, the interaction rules (1.3) describe a stochas-
tic process of the vector variable (v1(t), . . . ,vN(t)) in discrete
time t. Processes of this type are thoroughly studied e. g.
in the context of kinetic theory of ideal gases. Indeed, if the
variables vi are interpreted as energies corresponding to i-th
particle, one can map the process to the mean-field limit of the
Maxwell model of elastic particles [5, 6]. The full information
about the process in time t is contained in the N-particle joint
probability distribution PN(t,v1,v2, . . . ,vN). However, one can
write a kinetic equation for one-marginal distribution function
P1(t,v) =
∫
PN(t,v,v2, . . . ,vN)dv2 · · ·dvN ,
involving only one- and two-particle distribution functions [5,
6].
P1(t + 1,v)−P1(t,v) =
〈 1
N
[∫
P2(t,vi,v j)
(
δ (v− ε1(vi + v j))
+ δ (v− ε2)(vi + v j))
)
dvi dv j − 2P1(t,v)
]〉
,
which may be continued to give eventually an infinite hierar-
chy of equations of BBGKY type [5]. The standard approxi-
mation, which neglects the correlations between the wealth of
the agents induced by the trade gives the factorization
P2(t,vi,v j) = P1(t,vi)P1(t,v j),
which implies a closure of the hierarchy at the lowest level. In
fact, this approximation becomes exact for N →∞. Therefore,
in thermodynamic limit the one-particle distribution function
bears all information. Rescaling the time as τ = 2t/N in the
thermodynamic limit N → ∞, one obtains for the one-particle
distribution function f (v, t) = P1(v, t) the Boltzmann-like ki-
netic equation
∂ f (t,v)
∂ t =
1
2
〈∫
f (t,vi) f (t,v j)
(
δ (v− ε1(vi + v j))
+ δ (v− ε2)(vi + v j))
)
dvi dv j
〉
− f (t,v),
(2.1)
which describes the process (1.3) in the limit N → ∞.
Owing to equations of type (2.1), the study of the time-
evolution of the wealth distribution among individuals in a
simple economy, together with a reasonable explanation of
the formation of tails in this distribution has been recently
3achieved in [26] (see also [15, 16]). The Boltzmann-like equa-
tion (2.1) can be fruitfully written in weak form. It corre-
sponds to say that the solution f (v, t) satisfies, for all smooth
functions φ(v)
d
dt
∫
R+
f (t,v)φ(v)dv = 1
2
〈∫
R2+
(φ(v∗)+φ(w∗)
−φ(v)−φ(w)) f (t,v) f (t,w)dvdw〉,
(2.2)
where the post-trade wealths (v∗,w∗) obey to the rule (1.3)
v∗ = ε1(v+w), w∗ = ε2(v+w). (2.3)
Note that (2.2) implies that f (v, t) remains a probability den-
sity if it so initially
∫
R+
f (t,v)dv =
∫
R+
f0(v)dv = 1. (2.4)
Moreover, on the basis of (1.4), the choice φ(v) = v shows
that also the total mean wealth is preserved in time
m(t) =
∫
R+
v f (t,v)dv =
∫
R+
v f0(v)dv = m(0). (2.5)
Consequently, without loss of generality, in what follows, we
assign to the initial density a unit mean
∫
R+
v f0(v)dv = 1. (2.6)
Setting φ(v) = exp{−ξ v} in (2.2), [3], one gets the Boltz-
mann equation for the Laplace transform ˆf of f , where
ˆf (t,ξ ) =
∫
R+
e−ξ v f (t,v)dv.
Direct computations [26] show that ˆf (t,ξ ) satisfies the equa-
tion
∂ ˆf (t,ξ )
∂ t +
ˆf (t,ξ ) = 1
2
〈
ˆf (t,ξ ε1)2 + ˆf (t,ξ ε2)2〉 . (2.7)
As extensively discussed in [15, 26], explicitly computable
conditions on the gambling variables εi, i = 1,2, guarantee
that the distribution f (t,v)dv converges weakly to a universal
probability distribution whose Laplace transform is the unique
solution of
ˆf∞(ξ ) = 12
〈
ˆf∞(ξ ε1)2 + ˆf∞(ξ ε2)2〉 (2.8)
with
ˆf ′
∞
(ξ )|ξ=0 =−1.
This fact follows from Thm. 3.3 in [26] (see also Thm. 2 in
[1]), which links both the convergence and the boundedness
of moments of the equilibrium solution to the sign of the key
function G(s), defined as
G(s) := 〈εs1 + εs2〉− 1
In particular the convergence result is valid without additional
assumption on f0 provided that G ′(1)< 0.
By further requiring that the random variables ε1 and ε2 are
distributed with the same law, the equilibrium solution ˆf∞ is
found to be the unique solution to
ˆf∞(ξ ) = 〈 ˆf∞(ξ ε)2〉 , (2.9)
where the random variable ε is distributed according to the
common law of ε1 and ε2. Equation (2.9) can be better under-
stood by saying that, if Z is a random variable with law f∞,
the law of Z, defined in (2.9), is a distributional fixed point of
the equation
Z =d ε(Z1 +Z2), (2.10)
where =d means identity in distribution and one assumes that
the random variables Z1,Z2 and Z have the same probabil-
ity law, while the variables Z1,Z2 and ε are assumed to be
stochastically independent. Equations of type (2.10) are well-
known and extensively studied, see e.g. [17, 25].
III. THE PURE GAMBLING TRADE MODEL
Let us start from the pure gambling case in which (ε1,ε2) =
(ε,1−ε). Having in mind that numerical experiments are usu-
ally done with a random number drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution in [0,1], which leads the discrete market to a Gibbs
distribution at equilibrium [21], we fix the random number ε
to be a symmetric Beta random variable of parameters (a,a),
with (a > 0). We recall that a random variable is Beta dis-
tributed with parameters (a,b) if its density is
βa,b(x) = Γ(a+ b)Γ(a)Γ(b)x
a−1(1− x)b−1 x ∈ (0,1),
see, for instance, [18].
The case a = 1, where ε is a random number uniformly
distributed on (0,1), confirms the numerical outcome. In this
case, in fact, (2.9) becomes
ˆf∞(ξ ) =
∫ 1
0
ˆf 2
∞
(ξ x)dx.
It is easy to see that
ˆf∞(ξ ) = (1+ ξ )−1
is a solution of (2.9), such that ˆf ′
∞
(ξ )|ξ=0 = −1. Since (1+
ξ )−1 is the Laplace transform of the Gibbs distribution of unit
mean
f∞(v) = e−v (v ≥ 0),
Gibbs distribution results as analytical steady solution to the
pure gambling trade market, in case ε is a uniform random
number in (0,1).
4To treat the more general case it suffices to recall that, if
α1,α2,ξ > 0, then formula 3.197.4 in [20] gives
Γ(α1 +α2)
Γ(α1)Γ(α2)
∫ 1
0
xα1−1(1− x)α2−1
(1+ ξ x)α1+α2 dx
= (1+ ξ )−α1.
(3.11)
Using identity (3.11) with α1 = α2 = a, one obtains that for a
general a > 0 the function
ˆf∞(ξ ) =
(
1+ ξ 1
a
)−a
(3.12)
solves equation (2.9). Hence, the equilibrium solution results
in a Gamma distribution of unit mean, with shape parameter
a and scale parameter 1/a
f∞(v) = a
ava−1e−av
Γ(a)
(v > 0). (3.13)
To verify that the results of [26] and [1], which guarantee
the convergence to the steady state together with its mo-
ment boundedness properties hold, one needs to show that
G ′(1)< 0 holds true for
G(s) := 2〈εs〉− 1,
where ε is a symmetric Beta random variable of parameters
(a,a), with (a > 0). In this case, however,
G ′(1) = 〈ε logε〉< 0
is a simple consequence of the fact that 0 < ε < 1 with prob-
ability one.
The uniform distribution (a = 1) appears like a natural sep-
aration between two different behaviors of the equilibrium so-
lutions. In case a < 1, Gamma distributions (3.13) are mono-
tonically decreasing, starting from f∞(0) = +∞. In the oppo-
site case a > 1, there is appearance of a peak around the unit
mean value. The average wealth is unchanged for every a but,
when a > 1, the number of agents with a wealth closer to the
average value increases or, in other words, the wealth distribu-
tion becomes more fair for larger a. Analogously, for a< 1 the
distribution gives more weight to agents with a wealth close
to zero.
As a consequence, measures of the inequality of the wealth
distribution, such as the Gini coefficient, increase for decreas-
ing a and tend to zero for a→+∞. Some insight can be gained
by the simple computation of the variance of f∞. It holds
Var( f∞) =
∫
R+
v2 f∞(v)dv− 1 = 1
a
.
Hence the variance (the spreading) decreases as a increases.
There are two interesting limiting cases. The first one is
obtained by letting a → +∞. In this case ε converges in dis-
tribution to the constant value 1/2 and one can immediately
see that the steady state is a degenerate distribution concen-
trated on the value 1 of the mean wealth. This corresponds to
a perfectly fair distribution, in which all agents end up with
the same wealth. The other limit case is the winner takes all
game, which can be obtained letting a → 0. In this case the
steady state is concentrating on 0, while its variance is blow-
ing up. This corresponds to the discrete situation in which
a finite number of agents end up with no money, except one
which takes all. In the continuous case, the value a = 0 can
not be assumed directly, since the exchange of the limits a→ 0
and t → ∞ is not allowed by the lack of regularity of the equi-
librium solution for a = 0.
IV. ANALYTIC EQUILIBRIA WITH HEAVY TAILS
Let us now consider the gambling rule (1.3). In agreement
with the previous section, we assume that
εi =
1
4θi
, i = 1,2, (4.14)
where, for a given a > 1, θi i = 1,2 is a Beta random variable
of parameters (a+ 1/2,a− 1/2). It is immediate to reckon
that the random variables εi are such that < εi >= 1/2 i= 1,2.
Consequently (2.5) holds and the model is conservative in the
mean. We can invoke again Thm. 3.3 in [26] to prove that
there is a unique equilibrium solution such that its Laplace
transform satisfies
ˆf∞(ξ ) =
∫ 1
0
ˆf∞(ξ/(4x))2βa+1/2,a−1/2(x)dx, (4.15)
with ˆf ′
∞
(ξ )|ξ=0 =−1. In this case to apply the results of [26]
and [1], which guarantee the convergence to the steady state
together with its moment boundedness properties, one needs
to show that G ′(1)< 0 holds true for
G(s) := 〈εs1 + εs2〉− 1
= 2
∫ 1
0
1
(4x)s
βa+1/2,a−1/2(x)dx− 1
=
21−2sΓ(2a)Γ(a− s+ 12 )
Γ(2a− s)Γ(a+ 12)
− 1.
(4.16)
The proof of this condition is not direct. For the sake of
brevity, we postpone the computations to the Appendix.
Now, we shall prove that the solution of (4.15) is obtained
by taking the Laplace transform of the so called Inverse-
Gamma distribution [30] of shape parameter a and scale pa-
rameter a− 1, that is
f∞(v) = (a− 1)
a
Γ(a)
e−
(a−1)
v
va+1
, (4.17)
which is peaked around the mean value 1 and has heavy tails,
in that it decays at infinity like v−(a+1). An analytical solu-
tion of type (4.17), with a polynomial decay corresponding to
a = 3/2 has been discovered by Slanina [29] as self-similar
solution of a kinetic model of a non-conservative (decreasing
in the mean) economy. Motivated by the analogy with a dis-
sipative Maxwell gas, in [29] a decreasing in the mean wealth
5model where
v∗ = pv+ qw, w∗ = qv+ pw;
p ≥ q > 0, √p+√q = 1 (4.18)
has been discussed. Note that, within condition (4.18) on the
mixing parameters p and q,
v∗+w∗ = (1− 2√pq) (v+w)< v+w,
which implies that the mean value m(t) at time t decays expo-
nentially to zero at the rate 2√pq. The standard way to look
for self–similarity is to scale the solution. More precisely, de-
fine the rescaled solution g by
g(t,v) = m(t) f (t,m(t)v), (4.19)
which implies that
∫
vg(t,v)dv = 1 for all t ≥ 0.
In terms of the Laplace transform gˆ of g, it is found that the
equation satisfied by gˆ reads [16]
∂ gˆ
∂ t + ξ (p+ q− 1)
∂ gˆ
∂ξ = gˆ(pξ )gˆ(qξ )− gˆ(ξ ). (4.20)
Steady solutions to equation (4.20) satisfy
ξ (p+ q− 1)∂ gˆ∂ξ = gˆ(pξ )gˆ(qξ )− gˆ(ξ ). (4.21)
Direct computations then show that the function
gˆ∞(ξ ) =
(
1+
√
2ξ
)
e−
√
2ξ (4.22)
solves (4.21) for all values of p and q satisfying the constraint√p+√q = 1. Note that (4.22) is the explicit Laplace trans-
form of
g∞(v) =
(1/2)3/2
Γ(3/2)
e−
1
2v
v5/2
. (4.23)
Let us set p = q = 1/4 in (4.21). Then the steady solution
(4.22) satisfies
− ξ
2
∂ gˆ
∂ξ + gˆ(ξ ) = gˆ
(ξ
4
)2
. (4.24)
Following [4], Sect. 6, (4.24) can be equivalently written in
integral form as
gˆ(ξ ) =
∫ 1
0
gˆ
(ξ
4
ρ−1/2
)2
dρ , (4.25)
or, setting ρ1/2 = x
gˆ(ξ ) =
∫ 1
0
2gˆ
( ξ
4x
)2
xdx, (4.26)
which is nothing but (4.15) with a = 3/2. Consequently the
distribution (4.23) solves (4.15) with a = 3/2. This argument
establishes a connection between the present problem and the
non-conservative one introduced by Slanina [29], which leads
to explicit computations.
In order to prove that the Laplace transform of (4.17) is
the solution of (4.15), since a direct prove seems not straight-
forward like in the previous case, we recast the problem in a
more probabilistic way. First of all, let us note that an Inverse–
Gamma random variable Y of parameter (a,a− 1) can be ob-
tained by taking Y = 1/X where X has Gamma distribution of
parameter (a,1/(a− 1)). Recall that X is a random variable
Gamma(a,1/(a− 1)) if its density is
(a− 1)ava−1e(a−1)v
Γ(a)
.
Recall also that its Laplace transform reads
(1+ ξ/(a− 1))−a. (4.27)
As discussed in Section II, equation (4.15) can be rewritten in
equivalent way as
Y =d
1
4θ [Y1 +Y2] (4.28)
where Y1,Y2,θ are independent random variables, Y,Y1,Y2
have density f∞, while θ has density βa+1/2,a−1/2. The script
=d has to be meant as an identity in distribution. To prove
(4.28) it suffices to show that Y−1 =d 4θ [Y1+Y2]−1 or, equiv-
alently,
X =d
4θX1X2
X1 +X2
(4.29)
where X ,X1,X2 are independent Gamma(a,1/(a−1)) random
variables. The result follows if one is able to show that (X1 +
X2)(4θX1X2)−1 has Laplace transform (4.27). Setting G :=
X1 +X2 and B := X1/(X1 +X2) one rewrites (4.29) as
X =d 4θGB(1−B). (4.30)
It is a classical result of probability theory that, given X1
and X2 which are independent and Gamma distributed, the
random variables G and B are stochastically independent
and, moreover, that G has Gamma(2a,1/(a− 1)) distribu-
tion, while B has Beta(a,a) distribution. For the proof of
this property, we refer for instance to Chapter 10.4 in [18].
Moreover, using relation (3.11) one can reckon that θG has
Gamma(a+1/2,1/(a−1)) distribution simply by computing
its Laplace transform. Using now the fact that θG and B are
mutually independent, one can write the Laplace transform of
4θGB(1−B) in the point ξ as
L(ξ ) =
∫ 1
0
βa,a(x)[
1+ 4(a− 1)−1ξ x(1− x)]a+ 12 dx
= 2
∫ 1
2
0
βa,a(x)[
1+ 4(a− 1)−1ξ x(1− x)]a+ 12 dx.
6At this stage, a simple change of variable shows that
L(ξ ) = Γ(2a)
22a−1Γ(a)2
∫ 1
0
za−1(1− z) 12−1
(1+ ξ z/(a− 1)))a+ 12 dz
=
∫ 1
0
1
(1+ ξ z/(a− 1)))a+ 12 βa,1/2(z)dz.
The last identity follows by the duplication formula Γ(2a) =
22a−1Γ(a)Γ(a+1/2)/Γ(1/2) (see 8.335.1 in [20]). Using re-
lation (3.11) once again we get L(ξ ) = (1+ξ/(a−1))−a and
(4.29) is proved.
Some remarks are in order. Within the choice (4.14), the
conservative in the mean trade (1.3) is such that the two agents
maintain at least 1/4 of the total wealth used to trade. Thus,
trade (1.3) is in a sense less risky than the conservative trade
(1.2), where one of the two agents can exit from the trade
with almost no money. In addition, it follows that the number
of moments of the explicit equilibrium state which are finite
increase with a. On the other hand, when a increases, the area
described by the distribution of the random fraction ε on the
interval [1,+∞) decreases, and the probability to use wealth
of the society is also decreasing. Hence a fat Pareto tail is
obtained through a big use of the common wealth.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced and discussed the equilibrium
solution of a nonlinear kinetic equation of Boltzmann type,
modelling redistribution of wealth in a simple market econ-
omy in which trades are described by a standard gambling
game. Due to the simplicity of the game trade, analytical so-
lutions can be obtained in the case in which the post-trade
wealths depend on the pre-trade ones through random vari-
ables which are Beta distributed. Previously known analytical
solutions are here shown to exit for particular values of the
underlying parameters. Despite its simplicity, the model en-
lightens the role of the interaction in producing Pareto tails.
Appendix A: Appendix
Let us prove that G ′(1)< 0 when G is defined as in (4.16).
Starting from (4.16), differentiation shows that
G ′(s) =−21−2s Γ(2a)Γ(a− s+
1
2)
Γ(2a− s)Γ(a+ 12)
·
·
{
2log(2)+ψ(a− s+ 1
2
)−ψ(2a− s)
}
where ψ(x) = Γ ′(x)/Γ(x) is the Digamma function [20]. Us-
ing the duplication formula 2ψ(2x) = ψ(x) +ψ(x+ 1/2)+
2log(2), see 8.365.6 [20], one obtains
G ′(1) =−1
4
Γ(2a)Γ(a− s+ 12)
Γ(2a− s)Γ(a+ 12)
Q(a)
where Q(a) := 2log(2)+ψ(a− 1/2)+ψ(a).
Now ψ(1/2) = −γ − 2log2 and ψ(1) = −γ (γ being the
Eulero-Mascheroni constant), see 8.366.1/2 [20], and then
Q(1) = 0.
The classical expansion formula (see 8.363.8 [20])
ψ ′(x) = ∑
k≥0
1
(x+ k)2
allows to conclude that, for every a > 1
Q ′(a) = ∑
k≥0
1
(a− 1/2+ k)2 − ∑k≥0
1
(a+ k)2 > 0.
Hence Q(a) is strictly monotone in [1,+∞) and since Q(1) =
0 it follows that Q(a) > 0 for every a > 1. This shows that
G ′(1)< 0.
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